Noise and Cooperation in an Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Work in progress by Mario A. Maggioni, Chiara Nardi, and Domenico Rossignoli on noise, communication, and cooperation in repeated games.

Mario A. Maggioni, Chiara Nardi, and Domenico Rossignoli · Work in progress

Abstract

This study shows that noise (modeled as action reversals) weakens mutual cooperation in an indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: ex-post communication reduces cooperation only under no or low noise.
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How to cite

APA

Maggioni, M. A., Nardi, C., & Rossignoli, D. (2026). Noise and cooperation in an indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma [Work in progress].

BibTeX

@unpublished{maggioni2026noise,
  author = {Maggioni, Mario A. and Nardi, Chiara and Rossignoli, Domenico},
  title  = {Noise and Cooperation in an Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma},
  note   = {Work in progress},
  year   = {2026}
}

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